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Various studies show that agricultural cooperatives behave differently than their investor-owned 
counterparts. One explanation may be that the internal decision making process differs in these two 
governance structures. A model is developed to explore how endogenous screening rules affect 
efficient organizational choices and industrial structures. It is shown that screening level choice may 
outweigh architecture choice and that screening rules are strategic substitutes. Conditions are derived 
under which cooperatives are efficient organizational forms. It is also shown that competition may 
increase the attractiveness of investor-owned firms and circumstances are determined in which 
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 11 Introduction 
 
Cooperatives and investor-owned firms (IOFs) are alterative forms of business organizations that 
buy, sell, and produce goods and services. Various studies show that cooperatives behave differently 
than their investor owned counterparts (Van der Krogt, 2002 and Van Oijen and Hendrikse, 2002). 
However, it is not well understood why these two organizations behave differently.   
Another observation is that cooperatives and IOFs coexist in many markets. Hendrikse reports 
that both cooperatives and investor owned firms are observed in many European agricultural markets, 
e.g. pork, beef, poultry, eggs, milk, sugar-beet, grain, fruit, vegetables (1988). Similarly, Carriquiry 
and Babcock (2004) report for the USA that this coexistence is observed in the markets for hogs, corn, 
soybeans, wheat, and cattle. Various studies show that cooperatives have a number of advantages and 
disadvantages compared to IOFs (Vitaliano, 1983; Cook, 1995). From the perspective of governance 
structure, an obvious disadvantage of a cooperative is that it faces restrictions to issue claims against 
the residual profits of the organization. It is not listed in the stock market, which implies that 
cooperatives must finance investments through internally generated funds and debt, rather than issuing 
common stock. It also entails that cooperatives have less freedom to design incentive compensation 
schemes to motivate managers. The absence of a stock listing implies that equity-based compensation 
cannot be used and that there is no active takeover market replacing poorly performing managers. 
However, cooperatives exist in many industries. So, there must be advantages of adopting a 
cooperative.  
It is well known that the board of directors in a cooperative is different from that of IOFs 
(Vitaliano, 1983; Hendrikse, 1989). We claim in this paper that the difference in the board of directors 
lead to different internal decision making structure, which in turn leads to different performance and 
competitive advantage. According to the agency theory, the decision process can be separated to two 
compound components of decision management (i.e., the initiation and implementation of decisions) 
and decision control (i.e., the ratification and monitoring of decisions) (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  For 
modern firms including both IOFs and cooperatives, such separation of decision process is common. 
Normally, residual claimants retain approval rights by vote on the decisions such as membership, 
mergers, and auditor choice, and delegate most decision control rights to the board of directors. The 
board then delegates some decision control functions and most decision management functions to top 
management. In this case, sufficient board monitoring is necessary to guarantee the efficiency of 
firms. We claim more board monitoring is expected in cooperatives than in IOFs. For IOFs, the board 
normally includes insider (i.e. top management members) (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and in some case, 
top management even elects the board of directors. In contrast, the board in cooperatives are elected 
by and chosen from member-owners. Board monitoring is a public good. However, more active 
member participation in board monitoring is expected in cooperatives due to the substantial financial 
stake in the cooperative by the members (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001b). Thus, the board in 
cooperatives has more incentives, on behalf of member-owners, to screen investment proposals 
initiated by the management, while the board in IOFs are easily subject to collusions with top 
management and t less motivated in screening investment projects.  This can be justified by the 
following statement from the USDA (2002, p11).  
 ‘In an investor-owned firm, the chief executive officer (CEO) often has a large, if not dominant 
voice, in selecting the board of directors. Strong CEOs look for persons who share their vision for the 
future of the company and respect their managerial ability in selecting directors. When a new CEO 
takes over, directors who don’t share his orher views are often encouraged to relinquish their seats on 
the board. This places the manager in a position of strong control over both setting and implementing 
company policy. In a cooperative, the CEO usually has significantly less influence over who sits on the 
board. Incumbent directors may have outlasted several managerial changes. When a board seat opens 
up, the influence of the CEO in the selection of the new director varies greatly depending on the 
culture of the association. Some cooperatives look for guidance from the manager, others deeply 
resent any involvement by the manager. As a result, directors often don’t feel beholden to the manager 
for their position and have the independence, if they choose to exercise it, to question management 
decisions and reject its recommendations.’ 
This difference on board of directors has important implication on firms’ decision making 
structure. For IOFs, the board of directors is less motivated in screening project proposals and 
 2therefore real authority regarding accepting investment proposals mainly resides with top managers 
who initiate and implement investment projects. For cooperatives, the board of directors is actively 
involved in screening investment proposals and therefore real authority regarding accepting 
investment proposals mainly reside with the board. Hence, when screening an investment project, 
IOFs mainly adopt one level screening by top management who have powered of decision 
management, while cooperatives mainly use two-level screening by both the board of directors who 
have power of decision control and top management with power of decision management. Figure 1 
captures this difference. Dual screening may provide competitive advantage to cooperatives. In this 
paper, we will address this issue: how different screening influence behaviour and performance of 
cooperatives and IOFs.  
Sah and Stiglitz (1986) cast lights on how different screening structures influence performance of 
economic systems and economic organizations. economic systems and organizations can be viewed as 
a collection of decision-making units. The term of ‘architecture’ is adopted to describe how multiple 
decision-making units are structured together to efficiently accept and reject investment projects in 
different economic systems and organizations. Individual units’ judgement entails errors. The 
architecture of an economic system matters, because it affects both the errors made by individuals 
within the system and how those errors are aggregated at the system level. One main conclusion is that 
the polyarchy architecture (i.e. an organization accepts an investment project when any individual unit 
accepts it) is prone to accept more investment projects than the hierarchy architecture (i.e. an 
organization accepts an investment project when no individual unit rejects it). To compensate for it, 
individual units in a polyarchy architecture are more conservative in screening than his counterparts in 
a hierarchy architecture.  
Hendrikse (1989) further specifies the above analysis in the situation of cooperatives versus 
IOFs. It is found that a cooperative is distinguish by two decision-making units with veto power (that 
is, the General Assembly together with the Board of Directors forming one unit and the management 
at the processing stage of production) and an investor-owned firm is characterized by one decision 
unit. An investor owned firm accepts more projects than a cooperative, and a cooperative is desirable 
when type-II errors (that is bad projects are accepted) are relatively expensive. It is also shown that 
cooperatives become more attractive when the intensity of competition increases. However, the model 
provided by Hendrikse (1989) adopts exogenous screening, that is, it is assumed that, at individual 
decision making unit level, the probability of accepting good projects is always larger than the 
probability of accepting bad projects, and the probability of accepting good projects at individual unit 
level is the same for any architecture form. We will address the endogenous screening rules in this 




Figure 1  Investment Screening: Cooperative (C) versus Investor Owned Firm (F) 
 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine how the endogenous screening rules affect behaviour 
and performance of investor-owned firms and cooperatives. We find that the cooperative chooses the 
lower screening level to compensate for it centralized decision-making structure, and the impact of 
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 3screening level choice may outweigh that of architecture choice. It implies that cooperatives are 
inclined to accept more projects if the screening is endogenous. Cooperatives and investor-owned 
firms can coexist under some circumstances, however, as competition increases, the attractiveness of 
investor owned firms raise accordingly.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model and analyze the monopoly 
case. Section 3 extends the model to the duopoly case. Section 4 formulates a summary and indicates 
some paths for further research. 
 
2 The Model 
 
Our model consists of a four stage game, where we consider a monopoly as well as a duopoly. 
The first stage consists of the choice of architecture. Architecture choices are made simultaneously 
and independently when there is a duopoly. Screening levels are chosen in the second stage of the 
game. In the third stage, nature chooses the type of project. Finally, project acceptance decisions are 
made by the organization(s). Again, if there is a duopoly, then acceptance decisions are made 
simultaneously and independently. 
The monopoly case will be analyzed first. Define x as the net benefit of a project, where x = V 
with probability α and x = -W with probability 1 - α. Assume that the project evaluator observes y = x 
+ θ, where θ is distributed independently of x. Denote the density function of θ by m(θ) and its 
distribution function by M(θ). It is assumed that θ has a uniform distribution U(-ϕ,ϕ). Imperfect 
screening is captured by assuming that V - ϕ < -W + ϕ, i.e. V + W < 2ϕ. Project evaluators use 
reservation screening levels for screening: a project is accepted if its observed profit is above the 
reservation level, S, and is rejected otherwise. The screening function is defined as the probability that 
a project is judged to be good. It depends on its quality x and the screening level S, i.e. the screening 
function is p(x,S) = Prob[y≥S] = 1-M(S-x).  
Notice that the expected payoff maximizing screening level of an architecture will never be set 
lower than V - ϕ or higher than –W + ϕ. It will never be set lower than V- ϕ because that will only 
increase the probability of accepting bad projects, i.e. increasing the number of type II errors, while 
screening levels higher than –W + ϕ will only increase the probability of rejecting good projects, i.e. 
increasing the number of type I errors. The expected payoff maximizing screening level of an 
architecture will therefore be in the interval [V - ϕ,-W + ϕ]. 
Backward induction will be used as solution method, i.e. the screening level will be determined 
first as a function of the choice of architecture, and subsequently the choice of architecture is 
determined.  
 
Stage 2: Determination of the payoff maximizing S of architecture I 
 
Consider a cooperative with bureau i and bureau j. Bureau i choose S
i in order to maximize 
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This is a linear function. It implies that either V - ϕ or –W + ϕ is an expected payoff maximizing 
screening level. It reflects the result that the expected payoff maximizing screening level increases 
when either W becomes large or V becomes small. Notice that the screening level will be high, i.e. –W 
+ ϕ, when W is much larger than V. Similarly, the screening level will be low, i.e. V - ϕ, when V is 
 4much larger than W.
1 It can be shown the same conclusion holds for an investor-owned firm. The 
reason lying behind is quite simple. An organization, whatever its architecture is, will set up loose 
screening if it expects good projects to bring great return and therefore it is desirable to accept more 
projects. Figure 2 presents the payoff maximizing screening level choice as a function of V and W for 
each architecture, given the level of α. There is a set of values of V and W where S
C is low and S
F is 
high. This captures that a cooperative will adjust the screening level S downwards due to its tendency 
to commit many type I errors, while an investor-owned firm will adjust the screening level upwards 
due to its tendency to commit many type II errors. 
 
Line B V 
 
Figure 2  Expected payoff maximizing screening level of a cooperative and an investor-owned firm, 
for a given level of α  
 
Stage 1: Determining the payoff maximizing architecture choice  
 
The expected payoff maximizing architecture choice has to be determined for each value of V 
and W, given the level of α. If the value of W are so high that both organizations choose tight 
screening, that is, the expected payoff maximizing screening level choice is –W+ϕ, then the investor-
owned firm if preferred to a cooperative. The reason is straightforward. In this case, p(V, –W+ϕ) < 1 
and p(–W, –W+ϕ) = 0, which entails that there are type I errors (i.e. 1 – p(V, –W+ϕ) > 0) and no type 
II errors. The investor-owned firm performs better because it is good at preventing type I errors. 
Similarly, a cooperative is chosen as the expected payoff maximizing architecture when both 
organizations choose loose screening (that is V - ϕ). The loose screening choice of V - ϕ entails that 
p(V, V–ϕ) = 1 and p(–W, V–ϕ) > 0, which implies that there are only type II errors.  
It is interesting to note that a cooperative is chosen as the payoff maximizing architecture when 
the values of V and W fall into the intermediate region between Line A and Line B.
2 Figure 3 
summarizes the results regarding the payoff maximizing architecture choice by a monopolist. 
Notice that this result is in line with Sah and Stiglitz (1986). Regarding screening levels, the 
investor-owned firm as a decentralized architecture is more conservative than the cooperative. The 
cooperative knows that this architecture choice rejects a lot of projects, i.e. commits a relative large 
amount of type-I errors. It responds by choosing a lower screening level (i.e. higher acceptance 
probability) to compensate for its cumbersome decision-making process. However, these results are 
not robust with respect to the exogeneity/endogeneity of screening level choice. Hendrikse (1998) 
points out that an investor-owned firm is inclined to accept more projects than a cooperative given the 
screening level is exogenous. What’s more, the comparative static studies show that the attractiveness 
                                                 
1 The mathematics is in the appendix 1. 
2 A cooperative is preferred to an investor-owned firm because YC is larger than YF, where 
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 5of an investor-owned firm will raise, if the value of a good (bad) project increase (decrease), or the 
quality of the project portfolio proves improves. However, these conclusions are reversed when 
screening rules become endogenous.  
The results entail that the impact of the screening level choice is more powerful than that of the 
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The duopoly case involves two values for the acceptance of a good project. The decision whether 
the market has to be shared or not depends on a rival. We assume that the gains associated with a good 
project are split equally between the two firms when both organizations accept the project, and the loss 
associated with accepting a bad project is independent of market structure. The intensity of 
competition is captured by β∈[0, 0.5]. For example, if the intensity of competition is very intense, like 
Bertrand competition in a market with homogeneous products and unlimited capacity, then β=0. 
Sharing the market in a situation with a cartel is captured by β=0.5. Table 1-A and Table 1-B 
summarize these assumptions and reflect the payoff of the two organizations in the duopoly case.  
Notice that only payoffs of good projects are affected in the duopoly case. When a firm accepts a good 
project while its rival rejects it, the firm can capture all the gains associated with the good project. 







               Firm j  A  R 
Firm i     
A  (βV, βV)  (V,0) 
R (0,V)  (0,0) 
Table 1-A: Duopoly payoffs when the project is good 
 
Firm j  A  R 
Firm i     
A (–W,–W)  (–W,0) 
R (0,–W)  (0,0) 




 6Stage 2: Expected payoff maximizing screening levels  
 
In duopoly situation, each organization tries to maximize its expected payoff by taking its 
competitor’s action into consideration. For each organization, we distinguish four possible cases, that 
is, an investor-owned firm facing an investor-owned firm (FF), an investor-owned firm facing a 
cooperative (FC), a cooperative facing an investor-owned firm (CF), and a cooperative facing a 
cooperative (CC). In each case, organization i will choose its optimum screening levels depending on 
each possible choice of organization j, which gives the reaction function of architecture i. Appendix 2 
shows how each organization reacts to its competitor in the above four cases. Figure 4 summaries the 
results. 
Notice that the slope of the reaction function (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984) of organization i is 
piecewise vertical. There is a discontinuity in the reaction function of organization i at an intermediate 
level of the screening level of its competitor. Organization i will keep choosing loose screening (i.e., 
low screening level) when its competitor’s screening levels are high enough; as its competitor reduces 
its screening level, the organization will stick to its loose screening until the competitor’s screening 
level is reduced to be lower than a certain level. At that point, the organization will adjust its screening 
level upward. In sum, an organization will never reduce its screening levels when its competitor 
reduces its screening levels. It implies that screening levels are strategic substitutes (Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1984).  
The economic reason behind is obvious. Very tight/loose screening from the competitor does not 
change the expectation of organization i and thus does not influence the behaviour of organization i. 
For example, if the competitor takes such tight screening that it almost reject all projects, organization 
i will act as in monopoly case and thus choose its tight or loose screening depending on the values and 
composition of projects. If the competitor takes such loose screening that it almost accepts all projects, 
organization i will still act as in monopoly case except that the fact that it shares the benefits from 
good projects with its competitor. Only when the competitor takes a screening level that is low enough 
to take most good projects, may organization i adjust its screening level upward accordingly. In that 
case, if organization i sticks to its screening level, then the benefits from accepting good projects may 
so sharply reduced that the loss from accepting bad projects may overweight possible benefits from 
good projects.  
The crucial value for the discontinuity point depends on the choice of architecture of both 
organizations. Appendix 6 shows that how the value is determined in four cases (i.e., FF, FC, CC, CF). 
Figure 5 summaries the results and depicts that how architecture choices may influence the sensitivity 
of organizations. 
Notice that the discontinuity point for an organization facing the competition from an investor-











Figure 4  Reaction Function of Organization i, i=C, F, j=C,F 
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Figure 5  Reaction Functions of Organization i, i=F,C, j=F,C 
 
As we know, the optimum expected payoff maximizing screening levels are given by the 
intersection point of two reaction functions at equilibrium. Appendix 3 calculates the equilibrium 
results. Table 2 summarizes the equilibrium screening levels for two organizations in each case. When 
the values of the parameters are such that  0 ) 1 ( < − − W V α αβ , tight screening is the dominant 
strategy for both organizations in four cases, thus the unique equilibrium with both choosing tight 
screening emerges in four cases. When the values of the parameters are such that 
0 ) 1 ( ≥ − − W V α αβ , the equilibrium is not certain in each case; in general, one organization will 
choose the tight screening while the other choose the loose screening. For the former situation, 
economic explanation is obvious. When the possible loss from accepting a bad project overweighs the 
possible sharing benefits from good projects, preventing type 2 errors are far more important for both 
organizations. Therefore, it is better to set screening level high, regardless of the competitor’s choices. 
For the latter situation, the competitor’ choice directly influences the choice of one organization. If the 
competitor takes so tight screening that it rejects most bad as well as good projects, the expectation of 
the benefit associated with accepting good projects are increased for the organization, because it is less 
possible to share the benefit; thus, it is better for the organization to take loose screening  to take 
advantage of less type 1 errors. If the competitor takes so loose screening that it accepts most good as 
well as bad projects, the expectation of the benefit associated with accepting good projects are sharply 
reduced for the organization  because it has to share the benefit; thus, it is better for the organization to 
take tight screening to prevent type 2 errors.  
 
Values of  β α, , ,W V    
0 ) 1 ( < − − W V α αβ   0 ) 1 ( ≥ − − W V α αβ  
FF  ( ϕ + −W , ϕ + −W )  ) , ( ϕ ϕ − + − V W or  ) , ( ϕ ϕ + − − W V  
FC  ( ϕ + −W , ϕ + −W )  ) , ( ϕ ϕ − + − V W or  ) , ( ϕ ϕ + − − W V  
CF  ( ϕ + −W , ϕ + −W )  ) , ( ϕ ϕ − + − V W or  ) , ( ϕ ϕ + − − W V  
CC  ( ϕ + −W , ϕ + −W )  ) , ( ϕ ϕ − + − V W or  ) , ( ϕ ϕ + − − W V  
Table 2   Expected Payoff Maximizing Screening Level 
 
 Stage 1: Architecture choice  
The payoff-maximizing architecture choice in duopoly is determined by the calculation of the 
Nash Equilibrium. Table 3 presents the strategic form regarding architecture choice in a duopoly. The 
payoff associated with each entry are formulated and calculated in the following.  
S
i V－ϕ   －W＋ϕ  
 8 
Architecture j  Architecture i 
Cooperative Investor-owned  Firm 
Cooperative (YCC, YCC) (YCF, YFC) 
Investor-owned Firm  (YFC, YCF) (YFF, YFF) 
Table 3  Strategic Form of Architecture Choice Game 
 
The duopoly results are presented in Figure 6.
3 Two segments of the parameter space are 
distinguished by the line C, which locates 0 ) 1 ( = − − W V α αβ . The duopoly choices in each segment 
are indicated. For example, (F, C) indicates that the duopoly will consist at equilibrium of one investor 










The duopoly choices deserve some comments. Several comparative static results are similar to 
the monopoly situation. The comparative statics results regarding the size of the two segments are 
determined by the characteristics of the portfolio of projects. The gains associated with good projects 
(V), the costs associated with bad projects (-W), and the portfolio quality (α ) have similar effects. A 
higher gain (lower costs, improved portfolio) will increase the range of parameter values for which a 
cooperative is chosen.  
Notice β  have a negative effect on the choice of cooperative. As β decease toward zero, the 
range of parameter values for which a cooperative is chosen will be reduced. This result has important 
economic implication. It implies that the as the competition increases, the architecture of cooperative 
become less attractive. This implication is in accordance with the reality. For example, in agriculture 
markets where cooperatives are active players, drastically increased competition since 1980s has been 
reported in the literature. At the same time, many cooperatives are also reported to change the 
traditional structure in many ways, including switching to investor-owned firm structure or adopting 
more IOF relevant properties.  
In accordance with Hendrikse (1998), two different organizational structures may coexist in 
equilibrium. A cooperative is sustained in such an equilibrium because it faces a higher expected 
revenue of good projects in either a monopoly or duopoly. This is due to a cooperative is loose in 
screening level, which entails higher probability of accepting a (good) project. This effect 
compensates for being cumbersome in screening projects. An investor-owned firm is sustained 
because it reduces the expected costs associated with bad projects in either a monopoly or duopoly. 
This is due to an investor-owned firm is tight in screening level, which results in a smaller probability 
of accepting a (bad) project. This effect compensates for being more often on the wrong track. 
                                                 
3    Appendix 4 provides the calculations. 
 9However, when the screening rule is endogenous, there is no equilibrium where two cooperatives 
compete.  
Parameter values can be determined such that a monopolist chooses a cooperative in the absence 
of an entry threat, whereas it may switch from the cooperative architecture to the investor-owned firm 
when facing the threat of new entrants.  This strategic choice is captured by the segment between the 
line A and the line C in Figure 7. According to Figure 3 in the monopoly case, a cooperative is chosen 
if the values of V and W fall into the area between Line A and Line B. However, the switch from the 







− 1 1 , because taking investor-owned firm is a dominant strategy for any firms in the 
market. This observation suggests that the threat of competition from outsiders may induce a 
cooperative to switch its current architecture to the investor-owned firm architecture to take advantage 





Figure 7 Strategic Space for a Cooperative 




4 Summary and Further Researches 
 
  Understanding the decision making process in an organization is significant to both 
organisational economics and industrial organization because it provides insights on optimum 
governance of firms and efficient industry structure. In this paper we try to explain the differences 
between cooperatives and investor-owned firms by focusing on the structure of decision making. A 
model is developed to explore how endogenous screening rules affect efficient organizational choices 
and industrial structures. It is shown that screening level choice may outweigh architecture choice and 
that screening rules are strategic substitutes. Conditions are derived under which cooperatives are 
efficient organizational forms. It is also shown that investor-owned firms become more desirable as 
competition increase. The circumstances are determined in which cooperatives and investor owned 
firms coexist in equilibrium. 
The introduction of endogenous screening levels shows that previous results are not robust 
(Hendrikse, 1998). Making screening level choice endogenous seems obvious, because decision 
makers in organizations use, and therefore choose, criteria to evaluate investment projects. It is also 
natural to expect that they take into account in their screening level choice that they are decision 
makers within a certain architecture. However, the empirical evidence seems to be more in line with 
the exogenous than the endogenous screening level choice model. More research, empirical as well as 
theoretical, regarding the internal decision making process in cooperatives is required. 
One potential research direction is to differentiate the two decision-making units in cooperatives. 
The farmer as the up-stream decision-making unit may behave differently from the down-stream 
counterparts. For example, Cook once points out that farmers in cooperatives face portfolio problem. 
Taking the portfolio problem faced by the farmer into the current model may explain why the impact 
 10of screening level choice is stronger than the impact of architecture choice. Another potential research 
direction is to refine the current model by substituting the assumption of uniform distribution of noise 
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 11Appendix 1 Screening level choice in monopoly by different architectures 
 
Firstly, Consider a cooperative with bureau i and bureau j. Bureau i maximizes the expected 
payoff by choosing optimum reservation level S
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j j S V Vp S W Wp , the expected payoff maximizing reservation level is the 
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, bureau i is indifference 
to ϕ + −W  and ϕ − V .  












j j S V Vp S W Wp  captures where  ϕ + −W  and ϕ − V  are indifferent to a 
cooperative.  Line A in Figure 1 depicts it. For Line A, W=0 if V=0. What’s more, we 
have
) , (









= . Since   and   can not be equal to 1 at the same time, 
we have
) , (
j S V p ) , (
j S W p −
0
) , (










α .  
Secondly, Consider an investor-owned firm with one bureau i. Bureau i maximizes the expected 
payoff by choosing optimum reservation level S





















































α α V W , the expected payoff maximizing reservation level 






α α V W , the expected payoff maximizing reservation 






α α V W , bureau i is indifferent to ϕ + −W  
and ϕ − V .  






α α V W  captures 
where  ϕ + −W  and ϕ − V  are indifferent to an investor-owned firm.  Line B in Figure 1 depicts it. For 
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Appendix 2 the Reaction Function in Three Cases 
 
Case 1: two  investor-owned firms (FF) 
 
Given the choice for architecture, architecture i maximizes its expected payoff by choosing 
payoff maximizing reservation levels. That is,   
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The optimum screening level is corner solution due to Y
i
FF(S
i) is linear. In specific, for the values 
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We can get the reaction function of architecture j in the same way because of the symmetry of the 
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Case 2: Two cooperatives (CC) 
 
Given the choice of architecture, individual organizations (organization i and j) will maximize 
their expected payoffs (i.e. Yij) by choosing the payoff maximizing reservation level. That is, 
architecture i and architecture j will maximize their expected payoffs respectively, taking its 
competitor’s reservation level into consideration. For architecture i, it maximizes the expected payoff 
YCC, i.e.,  
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The first order condition reads  
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To maximize the expected payoff, the optimum reservation level should satisfy 0 = ∂ ∂
i
CC
i S Y . It 
gives us the expression for  as a function of the other organization’s reservation level , i.e. 
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The discontinuity point for architecture i is such that , i.e. 
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We can get the reaction function of organization j in the same way, because of the symmetry of 
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Case 3: a cooperative and an  investor-owned firm (CF) 
 
For architecture i, it maximizes the expected payoff Y
i
CF; for architecture j, it maximizes the 
expected payoff Y
j
CF. That is,   
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For organization i, the first order condition reads 
) , ( ) , ( ) 1 ( 2 )] , ( ) 1 ( 1 )[ , ( ) , ( 2
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To maximize the expected payoff, the optimum reservation level should satisfy 0 = ∂ ∂
i
CF
i S Y . 
It gives us the expression for as a function of the other organization’s reservation level  , that is, 
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For organization j, the first order condition reads 
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The optimum solution is corner solution due to   is linear. In specific, for the values of 
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Figure 5 in the text summaries these results in three cases. 
The value of the discontinuity point differs depending on the architecture choice of both 
organizations. Three points are worth pointing out here. Firstly, the values of the discontinuity points 
fall within the area [V-ϕ , V+ϕ ]. Secondly, the value of the discontinuity point for a cooperative 
facing an investor-owned firm equals that for an investor-owned firm facing an investor-owned firm, 
while that for a cooperative facing a cooperative equals that for an investor-owned firm facing a 
cooperative. Thirdly, the discontinuity point for an organization (either a cooperative or an investor-
owned firm) facing the competitor cooperative is larger than that for an organization facing the 
competitor investor-owned firm. It is captured in Figure 6. 
 14Appendix 3 Expected Payoff Maximizing Screening Levels at equilibrium 
 
In this appendix, we illustrate how optimal screening levels are determined at equilibrium. The 
method is to draw reaction functions for two organizations and then locate the intersected point in each 
possible case.  
We distinguish two cases regarding the values of the parameter variables such as  β ϕ, , ,W V . 
 
Case 1:   o W V < − − ) 1 ( α αβ  
All discontinuity points are higher than  ϕ + −W  and lower than  ϕ + V in this case. The 
following three figures illustrate how optimum screening levels are determined by the intersection of 
the reaction functions in three market situations (i.e., FF,CC,CF).  
Figure Appendix 3-case 1A depicts the reaction functions of two investor-owned firms, where the 
discontinuity points for either firms are both  [ ] V W V V ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 β α α α ϕ ϕ − − − − + . It shows that 










































ϕ + −W  
ϕ + −W  

























Figure Appendix 3-case 1C  Expected payoff maximizing screening levels of a cooperative and IOF 
 
Figure Appendix 3-case 1B depicts the reaction functions of two cooperatives, where the 
discontinuity points for either firm are both  V W V V α β α α ϕ ϕ ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ( 2 − − − − + . It shows that the 
equilibrium consists of ( ϕ + −W , ϕ + −W ). 
Figure Appendix 3-case 1C depicts the reaction functions of a cooperative and an IOF. For the 
cooperative, the discontinuity point is  [ ] V W V V ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 β α α α ϕ ϕ − − − − + , while it is 
V W V V α β α α ϕ ϕ ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ( 2 − − − − +  for the IOF. For convenient, suppose i=cooperative and j=IOF. 
It shows that the equilibrium consists of ( ϕ + −W , ϕ + −W ). 
In sum, the above figures show that the equilibrium screening levels for the two organizations are 
all  ϕ + −W . 
Case 2:  o W V ≥ − − ) 1 ( α αβ  
In this case, the values of the discontinuity points all fall into the area [ ϕ ϕ + − − W V , ].The 
following three figures illustrate how optimum screening levels are determined by the intersection of 
the reaction functions in three market situations (i.e., FF,CC,CF).  
Figure Appendix 3-case 2A depicts the reaction functions of two investor-owned firms, where the 
discontinuity points for either firms are both  [ ] V W V V ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 β α α α ϕ ϕ − − − − + . It shows that the 
equilibrium consists of ( ϕ − V , ϕ + −W ). 
Figure Appendix 3-case 2B depicts the reaction functions of two cooperatives, where the 
discontinuity points for either firm are both  V W V V α β α α ϕ ϕ ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ( 2 − − − − + . It shows that the 
equilibrium consists of ( ϕ − V , ϕ + −W ). 
 















Figure Appendix 3-case 2B Expected payoff maximizing screening level of two cooperatives 
 
 
Figure Appendix 3-case 2C depicts the reaction functions of a cooperative and an IOF. For the 
cooperative, the discontinuity point is  [ ] V W V V ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 β α α α ϕ ϕ − − − − + , while it is 
V W V V α β α α ϕ ϕ ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ( 2 − − − − +  for the IOF. For convenient, suppose i=cooperative and j=IOF. 
It shows that the equilibrium consists of ( ϕ − V , ϕ + −W ). 
ϕ + −W
ϕ + −W






























Appendix 4 Architecture Choice in Duopoly Market 
 
We distinguish two cases regarding the values of the parameter variables. The architecture choice 
at equilibrium will be calculated in the following. 
  
Case 1:  o W V < − − ) 1 ( α αβ  
In this area, the screening levels at equilibrium are ( ϕ + −W , ϕ + −W ). Note the expected 
payoff for one firm as Yij, where ij means firm i (either F or C) facing the competition of firm j (either 
F or C). Tight screening here means that both firms reject all bad projects. Thus, we have 
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Given its rival choosing the architecture of cooperative, the expected payoff maximizing 
architecture for the organization is investor owned firm, because YCC-YFC<0. Given its rival choosing 
the architecture of investor owned firm, the expected payoff maximizing architecture for the 
organization is also investor owned firm, because YCF-YFF<0. In sum, if organizations are rational and 
try to maximize their expected payoffs, choosing investor owned firm is one dominant strategy. 
 18Therefore, (F,F) constitutes Nash equilibrium. The economics behind this is that there are no type ІІ 
errors when the screening levels are ϕ + −W . It is important to prevent type І errors in this case. Since 
the investor-owned firm is good at preventing type І errors, it immediately follows that two 
organizations will both choose the architecture of investor-owned firm to increase their expected 
payoffs. No organization has motives to deviate from such an outcome, which constitutes exactly what 
is defined as Nash equilibrium.  
It is worth pointing out that the market structure of (F,F) is also an efficient structure in this case. 
In case that the equilibrium screening levels are tight enough to get rid of all possible bad projects, 
accepting more good projects will bring more profits from the perspective of whole society. Since 
investor owned firms are good at preventing type І errors, the market structure consisting of two 
investor-owned firms are more efficient than any other industrial structures. 
 
Case 2:  o W V ≥ − − ) 1 ( α αβ  
In this case, equilibrium screening levels are ( ϕ − V , ϕ + −W ) or ( ϕ + −W , ϕ − V ) for firm i and 
j. Without loss of generality, we suppose firm i chooses  ϕ + −W  and firm j chooses ϕ − V  at 
equilibrium. It implies that firm i rejects all bad projects while firm j accepts all good projects. For 
firm i, this situation is very similar to the monopoly situation, except that V has to be replaced by βV.  
Because there are no type ІІ errors, preventing type І errors are significant. Consequentially, the 
architecture of investor-owned firm is preferred because it is good at preventing type І errors. On the 
contrary, there are no type І errors for firm 2. Because there are no type І errors, it is important to 
prevent type ІІ errors and thus  the architecture of cooperative firm is preferred. Therefore, (F, C) 
constitutes the equilibrium architecture choice.  
Further, No firms are motivated to deviate from this equilibrium result. Given that firm 2 chooses 
cooperative, deviation from investor-owned firm to cooperative will reduce firm 1’s expected payoffs, 
because   . Given that firm 1 chooses investor-
owned firm, deviation from cooperative to investor-owned firm will also reduce firm 2’s expected 
payoff, because 
0 ) , ( ) , (
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